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I. INTRODUCION
Within the past decade, the number of federal cases involving a transfer of
venue has steadily increased. 2 As the various scenarios under which a transfer
may be requested have come to light, district courts have discovered a dearth of
authority in certain crucial areas. In an effort to compensate, the courts have
embarked on a collision course of convoluted reasoning only to discover that,
in venue transfer matters, compliance with certain legal concepts entails
clashing with others. Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the conflicts
between venue laws and other firmly established legal doctrines. In Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.3 the motion for transfer of venue appeared in
the context of a contractual forum selection clause. The Court questioned
whether the case should be decided under substantive contract law or federal
procedural venue law. The Court in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,'4 on the other
hand, found difficulty in dealing with post-transfer choice of law issues. In each
of these situations, and in many others, the courts have tried to inject some
measure of flexibility into the venue transfer statutes; they have encountered an
uninformative legislative history, and they have struggled, unsuccessfully, to
reconcile well-established legal doctrines with conflicting venue transfer
practices.
This Note suggests that there are inherent defects in the venue transfer
system, causing courts an inordinate amount of difficulty in their efforts to
work within the current framework. Part II examines the legislative history of
the relevant statutes. Part mII looks at the venue transfer statutes in operation in
diversity cases, focusing on unsatisfactorily-resolved pre-transfer and post-
transfer issues. This part includes analyses of both Stewart and Ferens. Part IV
will evaluate solutions offered by commentators in the past and will propose
changes in the venue statutes designed to eliminate the difficulties experienced
by the courts in transfer of venue cases.
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) 1406(A) (1988).
2 Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Orcidts and Transfers Within the Federal
Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677 (1984).
3 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
4 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VENUE TRANSFER STATUTES 5
The venue transfer statutes were adopted as part of the Judicial Code of
1948.6 Prior to their existence, a district court would dismiss an action brought
in an inconvenient forum, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, whether
or not that forum was technically proper.7 A "proper" forum was defined in
the general venue statute, section 1391:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the
claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose .... 8
Section 1404(a) enabled the court to transfer the case to a more convenient
forum if the forum chosen initially was proper. The text of this section reads as
follows: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 9
Section 1406(a), as originally enacted in 1948, provided only for transfer
in a diversity case filed in an improper venue. 10 In 1949, the statute was
amended to read: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought." 11 Thus, if venue was not in compliance with section 1391, courts
would have the choice whether to dismiss the action or to transfer the case, if
to do so would be "in the interest of justice."' 12
Unfortunately, legislative guidance in such sticky matters as choice of law
after transfer and citizens' ability to "contract out" venue rights is completely,
perhaps conspicuously, missing from the historical background of the venue
5 See Special Pamphlet on PL-773, June 25, 1948, c.646, 62 Stat. 937, U.S. CODE &
CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 695 (1948).
6 15 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MmIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 3841 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACrICE].
7 Id.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988). The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 prescribed
changes in § 1391. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
10 FEDERALPRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3827, at 261.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
12 FEDERALP.AC'CE, supra note 6, § 3841, at 320.
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transfer statutes. 13 In the absence of direction, many courts, in analyzing
section 1404, have focused on the statute's relation to forum non conveniens.' 4
The Reviser's Note commenting on this states, in part: "Subsection (a) was
drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting
transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper."' 5 Some
courts reasoned that, if the section were construed to be "in accordance" with
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, then the federal courts would have the
power to deprive plaintiffs of the whole law of their initial chosen forum when
transferring venue.16 Others asserted that section 1404 was merely a
codification of the doctrine. 17 In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,18 however, the
Supreme Court held that section 1404(a) was not intended to be a codification
of forum non conveniens, but was intended to be a revision thereof, designed
only to promote convenience. 19 This gives no insight as to how to solve the
problems that courts face today when dealing with the venue transfer statutes.
Without guidance from the legislative history of the venue transfer statutes
on issues such as choice of law and forum selection clauses, we can only infer
that the drafting legislators did not even consider these issues. Thus, modem
judges must draw bits and pieces from relevant cases, molding the statute to the
circumstances of the case at hand. Lack of coherence and rampant confusion
are the inevitable result.20
13 Note, Choice of LawAfter Transfer of Venue, 75 YALE L. 90, 94 (1965).
14 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Vaz Borralho v.
Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1983); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956); see also FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3841, at 319, §
3846, at 367.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1404, Reviser's Note (1958) (emphasis added); see also FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3841, at 319, § 3846, at 367.
16 Note, supra note 13, at 94 (citing Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the
Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 405, 457 (1955)).
17 Id. at 94 (citing Brown v. Insurograph, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1949),
Cinema Amusements v. Loews, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 310 (D. Del. 1949), and Kansas City
Shippers Ass'n v. Pennsylvania R.R., 182 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Mo. 1960)).
18 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
19 Id. at 31-32.
2 0 See Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989); Linda
S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forun, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjud'catory
Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291 (1988).
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III. VENUE TRANSFER STATUTES IN OPERATION
Although the venue transfer statutes apply to federal question cases, 21 most
of the recent problems have arisen in diversity of citizenship cases, 22 where
choice of law is an issue.23
In an ordinary diversity case, a federal district court must apply the law24
of the state in which it sits.25 Frequently, parties will choose a particular
forum, or else contract in advance to have disputes settled in a forum, that will
apply favorable law to their situation. Although the venue transfer statutes
dictate where, and if, a case may be moved, the statutes themselves do not
address which state's law will apply after transfer. Nor do the statutes offer any
guidance as to whether or not parties' contractual selection of forum supersedes
the venue statutes. These issues have been left to the courts to decide. Partly
because of the lack of historical guidance, and partly because of inherent
defects in the venue transfer statutes, cases decided under the current
framework are often confused, labored attempts to resolve impossible conflicts
with issues arising both pre- and post-transfer.
A. Pre-Transfer Issues
Institution of a lawsuit begins with the plaintiff's choice of forum; plaintiffs
have a right to choose, within certain bounds, where a case will be tried. 26
Most courts would hold that plaintiff's good faith choice should be upheld.27
21 A federal question is a "civil [action] arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
22 Diversity of citizenship arises when the "matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $50,000... [and] is between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined
in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States." 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
23 See generally, Marcus, supra note 2.
2 4 Although a district court must apply the "substantive" law of the forum state, it may
apply federal procedural law. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Although there has
been ongoing discussion regarding what constitutes substantive law for purposes of conflict
of laws problems, see, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1989), a basic
definition is "[tihat which creates duties, rights and obligations" as opposed to procedural
law which "prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or obtaining redress." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
25 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); see also Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (enforcing rule of Kaxon).
26 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988); see supra text accompanying note 7.
27 See, e.g., Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950);
H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1950) (cited with approval in Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 630-33 (1964)). But cf. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale
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Among the issues that complicate the choice of forum concept is whether forum
selection clauses in contracts are binding on both parties in light of the venue
limitations imposed by section 1391 and the venue transfer statutes. A look at
the Stewart case, mentioned above, is most instructive in analyzing this issue.
1. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.28
In this case, Stewart, an Alabama corporation, entered into a contract to
sell the copier products of Ricoh Corporation, a nationwide manufacturer with
its principal place of business in New Jersey.29 The contract contained a forum
selection clause providing that any dispute arising out of the contract be
litigated in New York City.30 Stewart filed a diversity suit for breach of
contract in the federal court in Alabama. 31 Relying on the forum-selection
clause instead of traditional notions of convenience, Ricoh moved to transfer
the case under section 1404(a) to the federal court in New York City. 32 The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that the transfer motion was
controlled by Alabama law, which looks unfavorably on forum selection
clauses in contracts. 33 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit decided that questions of
venue in diversity actions are governed by federal law, and that panel reversed
the district court and remanded with instructions to-enforce the forum selection
clause and to transfer the case.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 35 and
then held that the forum selection clause raised a procedural venue issue,
controlled by section 1404(a), rather than a substantive contract issue governed
by Alabama law. 36 In so holding, the Court had to distinguish its decision in a
prior case, The Bremen v. Zapata.37
Auto Parts, 713 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. I11. 1989); Viaggio v. Field, 177 F. Supp. 643 (D.
Md. 1959).
28 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
29 Id. at 24.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., Civ. Action No. 84-AR-2460-S (D. Ala. Jan. 29,
1985).
34 779 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1986).
35 484 U.S. 894 (1987).
36 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). Many commentators
criticize the Court's holding under principles of jurisdiction, see, e.g., Mullenix, supra note
20, at 366, and under federalism ideals, see, e.g., Freer, supra note 20, at 1136.37 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
1992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a. The Bremen v. Zapata and the Concept of Consensual Adjudicatory
Procedure.38
In The Bremen, the Court held that federal courts sitting in admiralty
generally should enforce forum selection clauses absent a showing that to do so
"would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such
reasons as fraud or overreaching." 3 9 The Bremen gave birth to the doctrine of
consensual adjudicatory procedure, which was contrary to 100 years of
prohibition "against party autonomy in procedural matters." 4° After 7he
Bremen, the Supreme Court reinforced that decision by holding, in several
cases, that parties could waive certain litigation rights, such as the right to a
convenient venue or the right to be heard in a judicial forum.41 The concept of
waiver grew to be widely accepted. It was said to be efficient as to time and
money spent on litigation, flexible, and effective as a bargaining chip in
contract negotiation. 42
The Stewart Court held that, where forum selection clauses conflict with
federal venue transfer statutes, section 1404(a) is controlling.43 In thus limiting
The Bremen, the Court also limited parties' rights to contract for venue, and,
by analogy, limited their ability to waive litigation rights.44
Instead of recognizing the waiver right, the Court held that the forum
selection clause was only one of several factors to be considered before a
transfer of venue would be ordered. 45 Other factors include: (1) the private
interest of the litigant, (2) relative ease of access to sources of proof,
(3) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses,
(4) possibility of view of the premises, if appropriate to the action, and
3 8 Id.; see also Mullenix, supra note 20.
39 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
40 Mullenix, supra note 20, at 294.
41 See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration
agreement); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (choice-of-law
provision); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(arbitration agreement); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982) (waiver of objection to personal jurisdiction as discovery sanction);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (arbitration agreement); see also Willis
L.M. Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice of Forn Clauses, 7
INT'L LAw. 530,535 (1973).
42 Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478,
488-89 (1981).
43 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988).
44 Freer, supra note 20, at 1115.
45 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-30.
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(5) practical considerations, that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive. 46
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated that forum selection clauses
should be given "controlling weight" when considering a transfer motion "in
all but the most exceptional cases." 47 After the decision in Stewart, however,
many lower courts have ignored Justice Kennedy's advice, as well as the
majority's, and have given virtually no weight to the clauses. 48 Thus, parties to
a contract cannot rely on a forum selection clause at all.
It is important to note that the Court did not hold that the suit had been
brought in an improper forum. If it had recognized the parties' unconditional
right to bind each other via the forum selection clause, the Court would have
ordered the matter governed by section 1406(a), rather than section 1404(a),
since that statute dictates procedure as to cases brought in an improper venue.49
The Stewart decision, thus, was not based on an analysis of the differences
between sections 1404 and 1406, even though earlier lower courts, in analyzing
this same issue, had held that the proper basis for transfer was section
1406(a).50 The court in Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp. discussed the importance
of the choice between the different statutes:
The statutory selection may be more than academic. The statutory basis for
transfer in a diversity of citizenship case may determine what the applicable
law is, including whether the choice of law rules of the state of the transferee
court or the transferor court apply. . . . T]he choice of law rules of the
transferor court's state would apply in a section 1404(a) transfer, while the
choice of law rules of the transferee court's state would apply in a section
1406(a) transfer for improper venue .... 51
Given the importance of the issue, the lack of analysis on the Stewart Court's
part is a glaring example of how courts in general ignore the ramifications of
the conflicts between venue transfer statutes and other legal doctrines.
In the absence of direct analysis of this particular question, we can only
infer that the Stewart Court rejected the idea that forum selection clauses are
46 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also 7B MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACrICE § 87-1 (1990) (stating that the Gulf Oil factors continue to be valid).
47 Freer, supra note 20, at 1116 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 21 (Kennedy, L,
concurring)).
48 See, e.g., Standard v. Ricoh, 742 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Ark. 1990); Dobris v.
Format, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13568 (1989). But cf. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Dennehy, 739 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Wis. 1990); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh
v. Fanelli, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11877 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1990).
49 See supra text accompanying note 10.
50 D'Antuono v. CCH Computax, 570 F. Supp 708 (D. R.I. 1983); Hoffman v.
Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
51 Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 550.
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binding. The Court might have drawn an analogy between arbitration clauses,
which have been held to be binding,52 and it might have looked at the fact that
objections to venue choice can be waived. 53 Instead, the Court avoided
analysis, ensuring confusion where forum selection clauses are involved.
Contracting parties cannot know how much weight such a clause will carry as a
mere "factor" in the evaluation of a transfer motion, should they try to enforce
the clause. Further, the Court may have indirectly encouraged breach of
contract. 54 Given the proper set of circumstances, 55 a breaching party could be
well rewarded by forum shopping instead of holding to the forum selection
clause,56 since after a section 1404(a) transfer, the law of the transferor forum
would apply, no matter which party transferred the case.57
B. Post-Transfer Issues
Noticeably absent from the venue transfer statute's legislative history is any
sort of direction concerning which state's law will apply after transfer of a
case. The Stewart Court did not discuss the choice of law problems that result
from a section 1404(a) transfer after a party disregards the dictates of a forum
selection clause. More recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Ferens v.
John Deere Co. 58 held that, after a section 1404(a) transfer, the law of the
transferor forum will always apply. Unfortunately, the Court did not deal
effectively with the complex problems resulting from its decision. It is
necessary to examine the Court's analysis in order to illustrate the need for
change in the venue transfer statutes.
1. Ferens v. John Deere Co. 59
In Ferens v. John Deere Co.,60 the plaintiff, properly asserting diversity
jurisdiction, filed a tort claim in a Mississippi district court for a cause of
action that arose in Pennsylvania, because the claim was barred under the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations. 61 If the case had been tried in Mississippi,
52 Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
53 28 U.S.C. Rule 12(1)(1) (1988).
5 4 Freer, supra note 20, at 1128.
55 If, for example, the statute of limitations had run in the forum state designated by
the forum selection clause, the breaching party could, as a result of forum shopping, find
another forum that would be proper under § 1391 where the statute had not run.
56 See Freer, supra note 20, at 1128.
57 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 520-21.
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the district court, applying Mississippi's choice of law rules, would have
applied Pennsylvania substantive law but would have applied its own, longer,
statute of limitations. 62 Under the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack,63 the same
laws would apply if the defendant transferred the case to another forum under
section 1404(a). In this case, however, the plaintiff transferred the case to
Pennsylvania and then argued that the Van Dusen rule should be extended to
include plaintiff-initiated transfers. The Pennsylvania district court rejected that
argument,64 as did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 65 but the Supreme
Court held that the transferee court is required to apply the law of the
transferor court, regardless of which party initiated transfer. 66 Since, in its
analysis the Ferens Court relied heavily on'the reasoning and decision in Van
Dusen, a close look at that decision is warranted.
a. Van Dusen v. Barrack67
The Van Dusen dispute arose from an airplane crash in Massachusetts.
Plaintiffs filed wrongful death actions in Pennsylvania, believing that they did
not have status to sue in Massachusetts, 68 but the defendants moved to transfer
to Massachusetts. 69 In its efforts to protect the plaintiffs' legitimate choice of
forum and law from the defendant's manipulation of the transfer statute, the
Court held that, after defendant-initiated transfers under section 1404(a), the
62 Id. This point was conceded after the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court
of appeals for consideration in light of the Court's decision in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988), that it was not unconstitutional for a Kansas federal court to apply its own
statute of limitations to a case which would be governed, according to Kansas choice of law
rules, by another state's substantive law.
63 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (held that after a defendant-initiated transfer under § 1404(a),
the law of transferor forum would apply).
64 639 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Pa. 1986), af'd, 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 494
U.S. 516 (1990) (held that to apply the law of the transferor forum would transform
§ 1404(a) into a device which would enable plaintiffs to forum shop for a favorable
limitation period, and, thus, would not be in the "interest of justice").
65 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (held that because
Mississippi had only insignificant contacts with the parties and the lawsuit, the application of
its law to the case would be arbitrary, fundamentally unfair, and therefore unconstitutional.
Since Mississippi could not apply its own law to the case, there would be no question of
choice of law after transfer).
66 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1990).
67 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
68 Id. at 616. (Plaintiffs, qualified to bring suit as personal representatives under
Pennsylvania law, had not obtained the appointments requisite to initiate such actions in
Massachusetts.)6 9 Id. at 614.
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law of the transferor forum would apply.70 The Van Dusen Court sought
justification for its decision in the Erie Doctrine.71
Two interrelated principles of Erie are central to the Court's decision: the
importance of uniformity between federal and state courts, and the prohibition
against forum shopping. These policies, as they apply to choice of laws rules,
were clarified in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 72 which
held that federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the
states in which they sit.73 The Van Dusen Court said that laxon required
uniformity of law within a state only "if the [action] had been commenced
there," 74 and so, since a transfer under section 1404(a) was really "but a
change of courtrooms," 75 "the critical identity to be maintained is between the
federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which
the action was filed." 76 In departing from the normal reading of Erie and
Klaxon, the Van Dusen Court, and thereafter the Ferens Court, ignored the
rationale behind the Erie Doctrine.
The goal of Erie and Klaxon in prescribing uniformity between federal and
state courts within a state was to prevent forum shopping between those
courts.77 If the transfer of a case under section 1404(a) results in the federal
and state courts within a single state having to apply different laws, then
knowing that difference will arise will influence plaintiffs' decisions whether to
sue in the federal or state court-the very concept prohibited by those earlier
70 Id. at 636-37.
71 Id. at 637-39 (referring to the principles of law handed down by the Court in Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that in an action in a federal court,
except as to matters governed by the U.S. Constitution and Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state in which the federal court is situated).
72 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
73 Id. Klaxon was reaffirmed in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3
(1975).
74 Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 628; see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516
(1990). Interestingly, the Ferens majority offers Klaxon as the reason why Mississippi
would apply its law to the case were it heard in the federal court in that state, but avoids
discussion of the Klaxon rule in its decision that § 1404(a) requires the Pennsylvania federal
court to apply Mississippi choice of law. Id.
5 Id. at 639. But cf FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3846, at 366. "A transfer
under § 1404(a) must be complete. The transferor court cannot transfer the case for some
purposes while retaining jurisdiction over the same aspects of the case for some other
purpose. As one court put it, § 1404(a) 'contemplates a plenary transfer, and so far as we
know a transfer for purposes of trial only is an animal unknown to the law.'" Id. at 363.
76 Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
77 Ferens, 494 U.S. at 534 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This type of forum shopping is to be
distinguished from permissible forum shopping, which occurs when the plaintiff's initial
choice of federal forum is not influenced by the different laws applied in the federal and
state courts within a single state.
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decisions. Thus, it appears that there can be no reconciliation between the
dictates of Erie and the effects of transfer under section 1404(a).
The drafters of section 1404(a) intended only that it be used to increase
availability of convenient forums and never contemplated the issue of what
state's law would apply after venue transfer.78 As we have seen, however,
"[venue] is... inextricably intertwined with choice of law problems.. .."79
Van Dusen attempted to skirt the choice of law issue by overruling Hoffman v.
Blaski.80 That case held that the language in section 1404(a) that a case can
only be transferred to another forum "where it might have been brought"
meant that the transferee forum had to be one where the plaintiff had an
unequivocal right to bring the suit at the time the action was filed. 81 Van Dusen
held that the statute referred only to where venue was proper.82 Ferens, too,
avoided the choice of law problem when it held that "the decision to transfer
venue under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience and the
interest of justice rather than on the possible prejudice resulting from a change
of law."83 As we have seen, however, neither Court successfully avoided the
problem; Van Dusen had to circumvent three important decisions to justify its
own, and Ferens refused to deal with the issue at all, relying instead on Van
Dusen.
b. Lower Court Decisions Interpreting Ferens
Although the Ferens decision purports to resolve venue transfer difficulties,
it has become increasingly apparent that lower courts are reluctant to follow the
Ferens holding, distinguishing essentially identical fact patterns to avoid an
unjust outcome. In Frazier v. Commercial Credit,84 for example, plaintiff filed
suit in the Mississippi Circuit Court in order to take advantage of the longer
statute of limitations. As in Ferens, plaintiff then moved to transfer to West
Virginia, where plaintiff resided, where the cause of action took place, and
where, as in Ferens, the statute of limitations had run. If the court had adhered
to the Ferens holding, it would have transferred the case and the Mississippi
78 Id. at 521.
79 FEDERAL PRACtiCE, supra note 6, § 3827 at 267 n. 17 (citing Manley v. Engram,
755 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1985)).
80 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
81 If Hoffman were still good law, the plaintiffs in Ferens would not have been able to
transfer their case to Pennsylvania. Since the statute of limitations had run at the time the
action was filed, they would not have been able to bring the action there originally.
82 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964) (the Court considered the
statutory context of the transfer section, its remedial purpose, and the consequences of its
interpretation in coming to its decision).
83 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
84 755 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
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statute of limitations would have applied.8 5 Instead, the court focused on "the
issue left unaddressed by the Ferens decision, namely, whether the interests of
justice are served by allowing plaintiffs... to file suit in Mississippi solely for
the purpose of capturing its longer statute of limitations .. ."86 The court
denied the motion to transfer on the grounds that the plaintiff had not met the
burden of proving that the transfer was in the interest of justice.87
Another interesting venue transfer situation appeared in Moore v. Enons.88
Defendant Emons appealed from a decision denying dismissal of the case and
granting a motion to transfer the case from the District of Columbia, where the
statute of limitations had run, to New York, where it had not.89 The court
noted that the choice of law problem would be especially harmful to Emons,
who had planned to establish a statute of limitations defense.90 Without
justifying its decision, the court transferred the case under section 1406(a),91
apparently for the sole purpose of ensuring that the law of the transferor forum
would apply, and that defendant would not be prejudiced as to his defense.
This stands in complete contradiction of Ferens, which held that "the decision
to transfer venue under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience
and the interest of justice rather than on the possible prejudice resulting from a
change of law." 92
C. Consequences of the Stewart & Ferens Decisions
Though the Stewart and Ferens Courts dealt with different sub-issues
concerning the venue transfer statutes, it is clear that the statutes, as they are,
have engendered a great deal of confusion within the courts. It seems as though
the statutes just do not "fit" well with other, well-settled legal concepts. In
order to achieve even a superficial harmony, the courts must engage in much
convoluted analysis. Yet, engaging the courts in "intellectual gymnastics" is
the least worrisome of the consequences involved. More problematic is the
message that the courts are sending to plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys.
It is now considered proper form for plaintiffs to file a claim in an
inconvenient forum where they have no intention of litigating, for the purpose
of transferring both the case and that forum's more favorable law back to the
85 Ferens, 494 U.S. at 531-32.
86 Frazier, 755 F. Supp. at 166 (emphasis added). The Frazer Court refers to the
following passage in Ferens: "No one has contested the justice of transferring this particular
case, but the option remains open to defendants in future cases." Id.87 Id. at 169; see also FEDERAL PRACMTCE, supra note 6, § 3854, at 439.
88 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14024.
89 Id.
90 Id. at3.
91 Id. at 5.
92 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
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court where they intended to try the case.93 Further, courts have encouraged
parties to breach contracts in which they agreed to have disputes heard in a
certain forum.94 Courts are fully aware that the cases may never be transferred
at all or that, if they are, they will carry with them the laws of the state where
the parties brought suit originally. Parties can thus have the benefit of their
bargain at the inception of the agreement, and also the option of violating the
agreement in the end, with the courts' blessings.
Though plaintiffs' attorneys may look forward to being able to employ the
"tricks of the trade,"95 limited only by their creativity and their client-base,
they should be wary of the new standards that are being set for pre-trial
preparation. If it is possible to manipulate the venue transfer statutes to the
benefit of a client, then choosing not to do so, whether out of a sense of
fairness, time restrictions, or lack of knowledge of the laws of distant forums,
could expose the attorney to malpractice liability. Such an attorney could be
faced with a disciplinary suit for failing to zealously represent the client.96
Nor do recent venue transfer decisions promote judicial economy. Over
two thousand cases are transferred under section 1404(a) each year.97 As the
new advantages accompanying manipulation of the venue transfer statutes
become obvious to more and more litigants, this number of transfers bound to
increase drastically. Transfer motions will involve the courts in endless matters
"peripheral to the merits, . . . postpone the day of trial," 98 and crowd federal
court dockets beyond their capacity to handle the overload.
From the courts' point of view, trying a case could also get very
complicated. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Ferens, the "file-and-
transfer ploy" will enable plaintiffs to "bring home to the desired state of
litigation [not only a more favorable statute of limitations but also] all sorts of
favorable choice-of-law rules regarding substantive liability in an era when the
diversity among the States in choice-of-law principles has become
kaleidoscopic." 99 In fact, Ferens and Stewart have formidable implications for
mass tort cases or multi-party agreements. 10 A court may have to interpret the
93 Daniel J. Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled, Judicial Authority
Circumscribed, Federalism Preserved, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything
Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court Contributions to Federal Civil Practice,
50 MD. L. REv. 632, 697 (1991).94 Id.
9 5 See Note, Fonan Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1677 (1990).
96 Id. at 1690 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBILrrY, Canon 7
(1980)).
97 Marcus, supra note 2, at 678.
9 8 Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice
or Injustice ?, 40 IND. L.J. 99, 101 (1965).
99 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 Barbara Ann Atwood, The Coice-of-Law Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation:
Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REV. 9 (1986).
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choice of law rules of many states in order to resolve one case. As one
commentator noted:
The elements of the "nightmare" are several: the accurate identification and
application of a particular state's choice-of-law methodology are often difficult,
if not impossible; and the continued adherence by numerous states to
traditional territorial rles of choice of law can produce results that may offend
a federal court's sense ofjustice. 101
The higher costs of litigating these cases, with their inevitable "mini-
trials," the increase in attorneys' fees resulting from the need to further
investigate litigation possibilities, and possible travel expenses, will detract
from the cost-saving measures, such as those employed in tort reform, that
legislators have fought long and hard to institute. If the venue transfer statutes
were designed "to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against
unnecessary inconvenience and expense, not to provide a shelter
for... proceedings in costly and inconvenient forums," 102 then the courts'
decisions have failed miserably in their attempts to remain true to the purpose
of those statutes.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Many commentators have offered suggestions on how to resolve problems
inherent in the venue provisions. Some of the most insightful ideas have
focused on ensuring that the law governing a case would be the law of the state
with the greatest policy interests in the case. One author, for example,
proposed the use of an independent federal choice of law. 103 This idea,
however, is arguably in conflict with the principles of federalism. As
established in Klaxon, "[it is not for the federal courts to thwart such local
policies by enforcing an independent 'general law' of conflict of laws." 104
Judge Seitz, in dissent of the Ferens majority at the appellate court level,
offered his assessment of the situation: "There may be... good reasons to
prevent clever plaintiffs from taking advantage of the transfer
provisions... [but] whether there should be restrictions on plaintiff-initiated
transfers under section 1404(a), ... is an issue that is best left to
101 Id. at 27.
102 Ferens, 494 U.S. at 525 (citing Continental Grain Co. v. Barge, 364 U.S. 19, 27
(1960)).
103 Note, supra note 13, at 125-26; see also RUSSELL WENTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS, 607, 609-10 (3d ed. 1986).
104 Note, supra note 13, at 132 (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487,496 (1941)).
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Congress." 10 5 In fact, the legislature has amended statutes in order to prevent
manipulation of them to achieve diversity jurisdiction: "A district court shall
not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or
otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the
jurisdiction of such court." 10 6 Since the courts' efforts to resolve the problems
inherent in the transfer statutes have been in vain, there may, indeed, be no
other solution than to turn to the legislature.
Although there has been much resistance to the idea of restricting plaintiffs'
venue choices, 107 there has been some support for the idea of revising the
forum selection statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Professor Robert Lusardi noted
that, "[s]ince the provisions [of section 1391(a)] are arbitrary they may allow
for suit in a highly inconvenient place while not allowing it in a convenient
one."108 Professors Estreicher and Sexton hypothesized that it would be
possible to use transfer and venue rules to minimize forum shopping in
conflicts of law situations. They recommend restricting federal venue to the
district or circuit where the claim or action arose. 109 In addition to reducing
opportunities for forum shopping, this approach would allow parties to "know
with certainty the law that would govern their affairs." 11° Although it is true
that in most situations the place where the action arose is also the most
convenient forum, it is conceivable that this idea would require litigation of a
case in an inconvenient forum. This would be an undesirable result.
A. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990111
In response to problems of cost and delay in civil litigation in the district
courts, Congress, in December 1990, passed the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990.112 In part, the Act codifies supplemental jurisdiction' 13 in new section
1367. The Act also revises the general venue statute, section 1391. The
amended text of section 1391 reads as follows:
105 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 819 F.2d 423, 429 (3d Cir. 1987) (Seitz, J., dissenting),
494 U.S. 516 (1990).
106 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982).
107 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 621 (1964).
108 Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Seivice of Process: Due Process Limitations on the
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REv. 1, 35 n.164 (1988).109 Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 804-05 (1984).
110 Id. at 805.
111 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
1 12 Id.
113 The term "supplemental jurisdiction" refers to jurisdiction given to the federal
court by way of pendant jurisdiction (i.e. pendant party jurisdiction, and ancillary
jurisdiction). See Thomas M. Mengler, et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation
to Cod'fy Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991).
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(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a
judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the
property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in
which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced. 114
The changes restrict, somewhat, plaintiffs' initial choice of forum:
This section also eliminates the century-old anomaly, now codified in the
venue statute, providing for venue in diversity but not federal question cases:
"in the judicial district where all plaintiffs .. . reside." There is no good
historical or functional reason for this distinction, which perversely favors
home-state plaintiffs in diversity cases. 115
Further, the changes appear to push for litigation in a forum that has a
substantial connection with the case. Thus, from a fairness standpoint, the
changes appear to be good. We must walt, however, to see how the courts
construe these changes before we can determine their effectiveness in reducing
problems of cost and delay in district court dockets. It is interesting to note that
one of Congress' findings places an affirmative duty on litigants and their
attorneys to make "significant contributions" to the "solutions to problems of
cost and delay."1 16 Such a duty does not mesh with manipulation of the venue
transfer statutes, as the latter leads to unnecessarily crowded court dockets and
high costs of litigating. 1 7 On the surface, however, the changes do not appear
to address what this author believes to be the most serious problems inherent in
the venue transfer statutes. In addition, it may well be that plaintiffs will have
to bear an inordinate amount of the financial burden for bringing suit; since
they are no longer able to bring suit where they reside (unless, of course, that
place also happens to have a substantial connection with the cause of action),
plaintiffs may be forced to bring suit in a forum inconvenient to them. If this
results in fewer lawsuits being filed, the federal court dockets certainly will be
less crowded, but plaintiffs may complain of a failure of substantive due
process or equal protection.
114 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (emphasis added). The Act
also prescribes changes for § 1391(b) (federal question cases) but this Note is limited to the
discussion of diversity cases.
115 136 CONG. REC. S17,570 and S17,581 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
116 Id. at 517, 570.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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B. Other Suggestions
In order to deal effectively with these and other problems, section 1404(a)
could be incorporated into the forum selection statute, while making some
provision for parties to waive objections to agreed-upon forums for disputes.
Thus, in section 1391(a) a "proper forum" would be redefined as one to which
the parties have previously agreed in a valid contract, or which is "convenient
to the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" and which satisfies any
of the following: (1) where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) where a substantial part of the events or omissions in the cause
of action occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the
action is situated, or (3) where defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at
the time the action is commenced.
To illustrate, assume that X and Y have drafted a forum selection clause
within a valid contract to which they are parties. The clause provides that any
dispute over the contract will be heard in the District Court of State A. The
State A District Court, thus, would be deemed the only proper venue, and a
"convenient" forum that satisfied conditions (1), (2), or (3) of the statute would
be improper. If the case were transferred, it would be to the forum designated
by contract. No party would get both the benefit of the bargain and the benefit
of breach of contract, and courts would no longer be in the position of actually
encouraging such a breach. Further, allowing parties to draft contracts with
valid forum-selection clauses is in line with the trend toward approval of
"consensual adjudicatory procedure" 118 evidenced by the upholding of
arbitration clauses and increases options for plaintiffs choice of forum.
Second, imagine a scenario in which plaintiff brings suit in a forum that
satisfies conditions (1), (2), or (3), but which is not convenient to the parties
and witnesses. The forum would be deemed improper. Imposing the
requirement of convenience at the outset in situations in which there is no
contractual forum selection clause will reduce the necessity for "remedial" 119
transfer and will promote judicial economy. This "restriction" on plaintiff's
initial choice of forum would serve not only to reduce opportunities for forum
shopping, but would also serve to promote litigation in a convenient forum.
Meanwhile, the essence of the plaintiffs forum selection privilege would be
retained and defendants would be fairly protected.
Transfer of venue of a cause of action brought in an improper forum would
be possible under section 1406(a). Providing there is no valid forum selection
clause, defendant could move for transfer upon a showing that hardship would
result from litigation in the plaintiff's chosen forum. This would give due
deference to plaintiff's initial choice of forum while allowing for some
118 Mullenix, supra note 20.
119 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).
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flexibility where needed. If the motion were successful, the transferee forum
would apply its own choice of law rules. This "change of law" is in accord
with current procedure under section 1406(a), since under this section the law
of the transferee forum always applies. 120 Only the plaintiff's initial choice of
forum would be given deference, but if plaintiff could show that circumstances
had changed and that the forum chosen initially was no longer proper, plaintiff,
too, could move for transfer. 121 As in the case of a defendant-initiated transfer,
the law of the transferee forum would apply.
Since the federal court in which the case was tried would be applying the
law of the state in which it sits, compliance with the dictates of Erie and
KMaxon would be maintained, and it would no longer be impossible to reconcile
the plaintiff's choice of forum privilege with the requirements of federalism
principles. Thus, there would be no need for the type of convoluted reasoning
exhibited by the courts in their efforts to "force a fit" with these principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The lower courts' reactions to the cases involving the venue transfer
statutes indicate a high degree of dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's
analyses in both Stewart and Ferens. Those who are most concerned with
justice have exhibited a general feeling of unease concerning the obvious
manipulation of the venue transfer statutes.
In conclusion it appears that the time has come for legislators to decide
whether they want to encourage confusion and "slick lawyering tactics." If
Congress were to redraft the ambiguous venue transfer statutes, only minimally
restricting the choices of venue currently available, it would strike a blow for
the integrity of the legal system and for the sanity of those who must operate
within it.
Maryellen Coma
120 FEDERAL PRACMICE, supra note 6, § 3827, at 267.
121 See James v. Daley & Lewis, 406 F. Supp. 645 (D. Del. 1976); Harry Rich Corp.
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 308 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
[Vol. 53:319
